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Abstract 
This thesis explores how national determinants influence the difficult task of international 
cooperation on global health, using the Liberal theory of international relations. The focus is 
on the United States and their rejection of a proposal presented by the World Health 
Organization’s Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: 
Financing and Coordination, but the findings illustrate a broader tendency where domestic 
preferences shape and influence international negotiations. Cultural, ideological and political 
preferences are studied in order to explain the United States’ position and negotiation 
strategies. The international impact of their decision is also discussed. 
 
 
 
  
VI 
 
 
VII 
 
Introduction 
Improving global health is an issue that has been high up on the international agenda for over 
a century. The growing health gap between the advantaged, Western nations on the one hand, 
and the poorer, developing nations on the other, however, demonstrate the fact that 
international efforts to remedy the situation have been insufficient. There are several reasons 
for the difference in health levels in the advantaged and the developing states, respectively. 
Developing nations are by definition poorer, and therefore less able to pay the cost of medical 
treatment for its citizens. Government expenditure on research and development (R&D) is 
often low, and the developing states are to a high degree dependent on expensive 
pharmaceutical imports from the advantaged states. Finally, the TRIPS agreement, which was 
signed in 1994 and established 20 year-long patents for intellectual property, gave 
pharmaceutical companies, mainly based in the Western world, an effective monopoly on the 
medicines they develop. The implications of the agreement were higher prices for 
pharmaceuticals and a reduced incentive to conduct R&D on diseases that mainly affect 
developing nations with lower purchasing power.  
 
Before long, the bias of the TRIPS Agreement in favor of the advantaged nations became 
obvious. In the Doha Declaration of 2001, the World Trade Organization officially 
acknowledged the ethical problems related to global health that resulted from the TRIPS 
Agreement. Because of the acknowledgment of an obvious bias in the advantaged nations’ 
favor, there was an increase in efforts meant to remedy the situation. In order for the 
protection of intellectual property rights to be upheld, however, Western states were inflexible 
in the question of TRIPS’s continued existence. Rather than removing TRIPS, they have 
pushed for solutions of a less drastic nature, and at the same time poured money into 
international aid aimed at improving the global health situation. No nation has contributed 
more financial aid than the United States. 
 
The United Nations’ public health arm, the World Health Organization, has established 
several working groups whose task it has been to survey the world’s public health situation 
and propose solutions to improve the direction the international community is taking. In 2012, 
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the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and 
Coordination (CEWG) proposed the establishment of an international fund for R&D into 
neglected diseases, with binding annual payments for all WHO members. The size of these 
payments would be determined as 0.01 per cent of the GDP from each nation. This number 
would ensure that all nations contributed equally, and the combined investments in the fund 
would provide a sum sufficient to fix the problems created by TRIPS, according to the 
CEWG. The United States is currently the only nation contributing funds for global health 
efforts matching the measure put forth by the CEWG. Because the establishment of such a 
fund would represent no additional costs for the United States, it was somewhat surprising 
when they almost immediately rejected the proposal.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the current global health situation, explore the 
proposals put forth to remedy the market bias in favor of the advantaged states, and use the 
Liberal international relations theory to explain why the United States chose to reject the 
CEWG proposal.  
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Helge Hveem for excellent guidance during all phases of 
this research project. His comments have been invaluable in the completion of this thesis. In 
addition, Christine Årdal at Folkehelseinstituttet and Ann Louise Lie at the Lancet-University 
of Oslo Commission: Global Governance for Health were kind enough to provide me with 
insight into current global health research.  
 
This thesis is 18,722 words long.  
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1 Background 
1.1 International Cooperation on Health 
1.1.1 Millennium Development Goals 
In September, 2000, the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, held in New York City, 
resulted in a unanimously adopted declaration of what course the international community 
should follow in the coming years. The Millennium Declaration, as it was called, contained a 
statement of values, principles and a new agenda for the 21st century, and was signed by 149 
Heads of State and Government, and 40 high-ranking officials from other countries. They all 
agreed that the most important functions of the United Nations in the future would be to 
ensure a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. Among the more specific concerns was 
making sure that globalization becomes beneficial to all, while recognizing that both the costs 
and benefits were unevenly distributed at the time. To remedy the situation, the Millennium 
Declaration called for global policies and measures corresponding to the needs of developing 
countries. The most substantial policy outcome that resulted from this concern was the 
commitment by all the state leaders in attendance to work for the reduction of extreme 
poverty via a series of time-bound targets. These targets are known as the Millennium 
Development Goals, and have a deadline in 2015 (The Millennium Declaration, 2000).  
 
The Millennium Development Goals are a combination of eight different, but correlated 
targets that are important for eradicating extreme poverty. These are: 1) eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and 
empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/Aids, 
Malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental stability; and 8) develop a global 
partnership for development (The Millennium Declaration, 2000). Goals 1, 4, 5 and 6, four 
out of the eight goals for 2015, relates directly to the improvement of international health. 
This thesis will focus mainly on target 6, combating diseases, but the weight attributed to 
improving the disparities in international health in the UN's Millennium Declaration is an 
indicator of the importance of the issue. 
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The Millennium Development Goals Report for 2013 
Target 6A of the Millennium Development Goals states that by 2015, there should be a global 
halt and reversal of the spread of HIV. The latest Millennium Development Goals Report 
(2013) shows that there is a steady overall decrease in the number of people infected by HIV. 
Still, HIV infects 2.5 million people annually and there remains a massive geographical 
divide in the incidence rates between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. In 
Southern Africa 1.02 per cent of the population between the ages of 15-49 are infected with 
HIV every year. The figure is 0.33 per cent in Central Africa, 0.26 per cent in Eastern Africa 
and 0.24 per cent in West Africa. Outside of Africa, the Caribbean, Caucasus and Central 
Asia have the highest HIV incidence rates with 0.06 per cent. This figure is still a lot lower 
than in the Sub-Saharan regions (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013, 2013: 
34).  
 
Target 6B aimed at securing universal access to treatment of HIV/AIDS for those who needed 
it by 2010. Universal access is defined by 80 per cent of the HIV positive (or more) receiving 
treatment. The situation has improved, but not nearly by as much as planned. In 2006, 28 per 
cent of those living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa received treatment. The figure for 2013 
is 56 per cent. This is a steady increase, but still far from the goal of 80 per cent by 2010 (also 
three years later, in 2013). Even more bleakly, the figure is lower for Asia and Oceania and 
especially for Caucasus and Central Asia, and there has been less of a growth than in sub-
Saharan Africa. The reasons for this is a combination of the lack of political effort put into 
solving the problem, an expansion of the group of people deemed eligible for HIV treatment, 
and very importantly, the high cost of medicines. (The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2013, 2013: 37). 
 
Finally, target 6C states that by 2015, the world should be able to halt and begin reversing the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases. Malaria is a disease that is mostly prevalent in 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in South East Asia and South America. 
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The measures taken to curb the transmission of malaria included equipping people with 
insecticide-treated mosquito nets and providing them with free of charge malaria diagnosing. 
In the ten years following the Millennium Summit, the global mortality rates from malaria 
dropped by 25 per cent. Most of the lives saved were in the countries with the heaviest 
malaria burden prior to 2000, which shows that the policies implemented were effective in the 
areas that needed it most. In 2011, 50 of 99 countries were on track to reduce the incidence 
rate of malaria by 75 per cent by 2015. However, there is a need for sustained and 
strengthened efforts to ensure further reversal of malaria. The use of insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets is far from universal; the use of an inferior malaria drug is still widespread, 
when other, much better pharmaceuticals are on the market; and there is great concern as to 
the rising number of incidents involving strains of malaria resistant to antimalarial drugs and 
mosquito resistant to insecticides. In 2011, it was estimated that USD 5.1 billion was needed 
to prevent, diagnose and treat malaria. The global funding available fell USD 2.8 billion short, 
and the threat of malaria resurgence remains (The Millennium Development Goals Report 
2013, 2013: 38-39).  
 
Tuberculosis is the third focus disease of the Millennium Development Goals agenda. There 
has been a slow, but steady decrease in the number of new infections annually, and if the 
trend continues, we achieve the goal of halting and reversing the disease on a global scale by 
2015. However, in 2011, 8.7 million people were newly diagnosed with tuberculosis, 5.8 
million received official notice of the diagnosis, 1.1 million died from it, and 12 million were 
living with it. Most of these cases were located in Africa and Asia. There is also a constant 
need for control efforts in order to prevent resurgence in the over 2 billion people who have 
had tuberculosis in the past (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013, 2013: 39).  
 
1.1.2 The World Health Organization's World Health Statistics for 
2013 
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) World Health Statistics is a report of the current 
international health situation, which is published annually. Its purpose is to map developments 
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in global health, as well as to create awareness of the inequality that persists in the health 
situation of advantaged states on the one hand and developing countries on the other. The 
World Health Statistics report uses relevant indicators of national health and health systems in 
order to produce comparable figures of measuring global health. These include life 
expectancy and mortality, cause-specific mortality and morbidity, selected infectious diseases, 
health service coverage, risk factors, health systems, health expenditure, health inequities, 
demographic and socioeconomic statistics. The 2013 report shows that there are still vast 
global differences between advantaged and developing states in health indicators despite the 
collective action that resulted from the agreement of the Millennium Development Goals over 
a decade ago. These differences are applicable to all of the above-mentioned areas, but the 
statistics on cause-specific mortality and morbidity and infectious diseases are particularly 
interesting for the purpose of this thesis (World Health Statistics, 2013).  
 
Cause-specific mortality and morbidity 
This section of the World Health Statistics covers the broad categories of communicable 
diseases, non-communicable diseases and deaths resulting from injury. It also provides 
estimates of the percentage of deaths among children below five years that are attributable to 
communicable diseases (World Health Statistics, 2013: 61).  
 
The mortality rates for communicable diseases confirm the geographical differences in health 
levels found in the Millennium Development Goals Report. The African region, defined by 
the WHO as the sub-Saharan states and Algeria, has a much higher mortality rate for 
communicable and non-communicable diseases than the rest of the world. This is a result of 
the lack of prevention and treatment of widespread communicable and non-communicable 
diseases such as HIV, diarrhea, measles, malaria and pneumonia on the one hand, and cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases on the other. Estimates are 
made from age-standardized all-cause mortality rates among adults aged 30-70 years and the 
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number of such deaths caused by the non-communicable diseases mentioned above (World 
Health Statistics, 2013: 78). The regions presented below are the standard WHO groupings1. 
 
Table 1. Age-standardized mortality rates by cause (only diseases presented, per 100 000 population). 
Numbers for 2008 (World Health Statistics, 2013: 78). 
WHO Region Communicable Non-communicable 
African Region 798 779 
Region of the Americas 72 455 
South-East Asia Region 334 676 
European Region 51 532 
Eastern Mediterranean Region 254 706 
Western Pacific Region 74 534 
 
The African Region has more than twice as many deaths per 100 000 population from 
communicable diseases than the South-East Asia Region, which has the second highest rate. 
The rate is approximately 11 times higher than that of the Western Pacific Region and of the 
Americas and over 15 times higher than the rate in the European Region. The numbers for 
non-communicable diseases also indicate a vast health gap between sub-Saharan Africa and 
especially the Americas and the European Region, even if the absolute differences are smaller 
than for the communicable diseases. The same is true if one looks at the figures for mortality 
rates for children under five, and the estimated causes of death. I only include the rates for 
deaths resulting from communicable diseases that have a known treatment. The regions are 
the same as those in table 1.  
 
Table 2. Number of deaths among children aged <5 years. Numbers for 2010 (World Health Statistics, 
2013: 78-79) 
WHO Total Distribution of causes of death (in per cent) 
                                                 
1The important thing to note is that Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia are 
part of the Eastern Mediterranean Region, not the Africa Region. 
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Region (000s) 
  HIV Diarrhea Measles Malaria Pneumonia Other diseases 
African  3508 4 11 1 15 17 12 
Americas 284 1 4 0 0 9 19 
S.-E. Asia 2127 0 11 3 1 22 21 
European 155 1 4 0 0 12 21 
E. Med. 1070 0 11 1 1 20 19 
W. Pacific 467 0 4 1 0 16 17 
There are over three and a half million deaths of children under the age of five in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Diseases, many of which are highly treatable, cause 60 per cent of these deaths. The 
low distribution and high cost of pharmaceuticals and other treatment are important causes of 
the high mortality rate from communicable diseases all over the world, but especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. Providing affordable medicines to the world’s developing regions could save 
millions of lives.  
 
Selected infectious diseases 
The World Health Statistics also report the official recorded numbers of certain infectious 
diseases. These are selected based on availability of recorded incidents, and risk of endemic 
development and demonstrate geographical hot-zones. Because some of the diseases are like 
plague and cause outbreaks, the numbers can fluctuate greatly from one year to another. Table 
3 presents the most recent statistics available for a selection of infectious diseases in the 
WHO regions. There are many gaps in the reporting of medical conditions, so the numbers 
cannot offer an accurate account of the prevalence of each disease. The figures in table 3 are 
of reported cases where the patient has received notice of his or her diagnosis. No effort was 
made to try to estimate the actual numbers. Such endeavors produce highly unreliable results. 
However, they can give some indication as to the importance and relevance of the various 
diseases according to geographical region. Where possible, there is a distinction between zero 
number of cases and unknown number of cases (World Health Statistics, 2013: 83). 
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Table 3. Number of reported cases of selected diseases (World Health Statistics, 2013: 92-93) 
WHO 
Region 
Cholera 
(2011) 
Leprosy 
(2011) 
Malaria 
(2011) 
Measles 
(2011) 
Meningitis 
(2012) 
Pertussis 
(2011) 
African 110 915 17 953 20 168 253 194 364 28 281 5 816 
Americas 361 266 36 817 489 296 1 249 … 26 901 
S.-E. Asia … 160 132 2 149 205 65 161 … 38 995 
European … … … 37 073 … 29 732 
E. Med. 114 999 4 346 796 178 35 923 … 8 514 
W. Pacific 2 296 5 086 223 338 21 050 … 52 089 
 
Table 3 continued.  
WHO 
Region 
Poliomyelitis 
(2012) 
Rubella 
(2011) 
Tuberculosis 
(2011) 
Yellow 
fever (2011) 
African 168 16 190 1 367 193 2 446 
Americas 0 9 218 328 17 
S.-E. Asia 0 … 2 138 688 … 
European 117 9 672 285 789 0 
E. Med.  0 2 749 411 587 … 
W. Pacific 0 76 022 1 350 639 … 
 
The advantaged states, especially the ones in the European Region, generally have very low 
numbers of reported cases compared to the developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa, South-
East Asia and to some extent the Western Pacific Region. Malaria, tuberculosis, and measles, 
are the most widespread judging by these figures. Measles vaccination can and has caused 
drastically falling rates for death by measles in developing countries between 2000 and 2011 
(Measles, 2013). This provides further incentive for making the availability of vaccination 
universal. Furthermore, apart from a few rare strains of malaria and tuberculosis, 
pharmaceuticals are highly effective in curing these conditions.  
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1.2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 
1.2.1 Signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1994 
The Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (which we now 
know as the World Trade Organization (WTO)), was concluded in 1994. It was the eighth 
round of multilateral negotiations to reach a general, global set of rules for international trade. 
A very important result of the Uruguay round was the establishment of minimum standards 
for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Intellectual property are creations of 
the mind and include copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Before this, each country had their 
own set of rules concerning IPR, and they varied greatly. In the 1970s, this became a concern 
for the developed, advantaged states. The costs of research and development (R&D) were 
rising quickly. This was especially true for pharmaceuticals, electronics and computer 
software. At the same time, the lack of an international system for protection of property 
rights meant that producers in other countries could take advantage of the progress made and 
produce the same products or use the same techniques without paying for the development of 
these. This reduced the incentive for innovational activity because there was no advantage to 
being first. Actually, to be first under the previous regime meant that you had to pay for the 
R&D without being able to exclude those who had not from reaping the benefits. The TRIPS 
agreement, which went into effect in January 1995, was signed in order to remedy this market 
failure and promote innovation. A public interest consideration was included; members could 
exclude patentability for medicinal innovations used in the treatment of animals and humans. 
In cases where this is not relevant, patent rights, which include those for pharmaceuticals, last 
20 years. A compulsory licensing provision was included, so that countries who are unable to 
produce the pharmaceuticals domestically can import them. There are also instances where a 
country can choose to waive the compulsory license, i.e. in the case of a national emergency, 
but this is rare (Higgins, 2009: 43-44). According to Susan Sell, the signing of the TRIPS-
agreement was a direct consequence of lobbyism from U.S.-American pharmaceutical 
companies who demanded that their government put IPR on the agenda at the Uruguay 
Round. She believes the agreement is an example of how private forces work to alter the 
broad distributional and political patterns of the world. The TRIPS-agreement altered these in 
favor of all the advantaged countries, but especially the United States, which was home to 
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many of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the world. These companies have profited 
massively on the extension of IPR patents (Sell, 2002).  
 
1.2.2 The effects of the TRIPS agreement 
The problem with the TRIPS agreement is that it does not take into consideration the 
differences in technological and socioeconomic level of the advantaged, developed states, and 
the developing ones. In addition, due to the new international rules for pharmaceuticals, the 
agreement had and continues to have major ramifications for international health, but the 
negotiations were carried out without extensive consultation of public health authorities. 
Providing innovators with patent rights for 20 years has caused its own market failures, and 
these have dire consequences (Correa, 2001: 381).  
 
First, patent holders can effectively exclude competition and set the price of their product as 
high as they please. Lifesaving medications are necessity goods for those who need them, and 
they have a low price elasticity of demand. This means that an increase in the price will not 
diminish the demand for it proportionally. The monopoly power created by the patent rights 
system, another market failure, means that pharmaceutical companies can effectively set the 
price they see fit without worrying about competition pushing the price down. In the 
advantaged states, people are able to pay much more for pharmaceuticals than people in the 
developing states. Furthermore, in most of the states in the former category a public health 
care system takes care of the whole or most of the costs for medical treatments. This pushes 
the world prices for pharmaceuticals up. Lifesaving medicine can become unaffordable for the 
developing nations, which was exactly what happened in the case of HIV/AIDS medication 
for the sub-Saharan African nations. In South Africa, the AIDS epidemic became so potent 
that the government threatened to declare a national emergency in order to import generic 
drugs because of the unaffordable prices charged by pharmaceutical companies in the 
advantaged nations (Correa, 2001: 381). Alliances between researchers, civil society, the 
WHO and MPs from many nations have fought for softer regulations, but The United States 
has pursued a strategy of strengthening the laws for IPRs, and the European Union has 
followed suit (Hveem, 2012). 
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A second result of the gap in the purchasing power between the advantaged and developing 
nations is the amount of R&D that goes into improving treatment for life-threatening diseases. 
Pharmaceutical companies are responsible towards their shareholders, whose main interest, 
generally speaking, is increasing profit. Because markets in advantaged countries are more 
profitable, these companies tend to neglect R&D into diseases that are killing millions of 
people in developing nations, like malaria and tuberculosis. At the same time, huge sums go 
into slightly improving or altering drugs for conditions that are common in the advantaged 
nations, but not life threatening. A significant part of the industry’s capital goes into 
expanding the lifetime of patent rights for drugs already in existence. This is capital that could 
be spent on R&D (Correa, 2001: 381).  
 
Third, the benefits of patent protection are only available in economies of scale, where high 
costs can yield high gains. Most developing nations lack these systems. They have neither the 
infrastructure nor capital necessary for competing with the advantaged nations in the field of 
R&D, and therefore they very rarely benefit from the patent protection system. There were 
also theories, prior to the signing of the TRIPS agreement, that the new patent protection 
system would encourage foreign direct investment and technology transfer to the 
pharmaceutical companies of developing states, and hence their industry would develop. This 
has not materialized, and experience from Latin America shows that most pharmaceutical 
companies were denationalized in the years since 1995 (Correa, 2001: 381).  
 
Strengthening the international regime for regulating property rights certainly has it benefits. 
It encourages the pharmaceutical industry to develop and reap the benefits of their 
innovations, and works quite well in isolated regions. The problem is that the patent property 
system, on a global arena, affects developing nations very differently from the advantaged 
ones. There is a one-sided relationship where the roles of consumer and producer are highly 
fixed, and the resulting market failures negatively affect the consumer. In recent years, many 
international actors, and especially the victims of the TRIPS-agreement, have voiced the need 
for an international political strategy to connect the diverging paths of commercial and public 
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interest in global health. This culminated in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Global Health (Sell, 2002, 482). The essence of the Doha Declaration is captured in 
paragraph 4:  
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all 
(Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2001). 
 
However, in the 2009 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, the European Commission 
stressed the importance of a continued commitment to the regulation of IPRs: 
The pharmaceutical sector in the EU indeed has one of the highest investments in 
R&D in Europe and relies significantly on intellectual property rights to protect 
innovation. The exclusivity periods granted through patent law and other mechanisms 
(SPC, data exclusivity) provide incentives to originator companies to continue 
innovating (The European Commission, 2009, 2). 
 
Protestors have succeeded in softening, but no eliminating, the constraints of the TRIPS-
agreement (Sell, 2002, 482).  
 
1.3 Proposals to Remedy the Global Health Situation 
Several proposals exist as to how the international community should respond to the growing 
problem of unaffordable medication and the lack of R&D on neglected diseases. The 
establishment of prize-funds is one of them (Ganslandt, et al., 2001), but Buchanan et al. 
(2011) argue that the creation of more economic incentives will not alone be sufficient in 
stimulating R&D. Rather, the creation of an international institution is necessary. This 
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institution would ensure the provision of affordable medicines to all nations with a standing 
compulsory licensing offer for firms that restrict access to their medication through monopoly 
pricing. One suggestion along these lines is The Health Impact Fund (Hollis and Pogge, 
2008), which is a theoretical international scheme to lower the prices of pharmaceuticals and 
encourage research into diseases that affect developing countries, using a system of market-
based mechanisms. The World Health Organization’s Consultative Expert Working Group on 
Research and Development (CEWG) has made a similar, but perhaps a slightly more realistic 
proposal that focuses on the latter of these problems.  
 
1.3.1 The Health Impact Fund 
Yale professor and philosopher Thomas Pogge and economist Aidan Hollis have created one 
of the most developed theories of institutionalized international cooperation for the 
improvement of global health. The Health Impact Fund is an ambitious plan. Membership for 
both states and pharmaceutical companies is voluntary, but the system requires states to pay 
0.03 per cent of their GDP into the fund annually. The pharmaceutical companies that sign on 
receive payment according to the lifesaving capacity of their drugs, rather than by ordinary 
market mechanisms (Hollis and Pogge, 2008). Many internationally renowned scholars such 
as Noam Chomsky and Nobel Prize winners in economics, Kenneth J. Arrow and Amartya 
Sen (Advisory Board, 2014), support this proposal. It remains, however, a theoretical 
possibility. The Health Impact Fund has not been seriously considered and debated in a 
multilateral arena. However, a committee set down by the WHO, the Consultative Expert 
Working Group on Research and Development (CEWG) made a specific proposal in 2012. At 
the World Health Assembly in Geneva, they proposed a less complicated and costly remedy 
for the problem of R&D into neglected diseases. State officials from the Americas, France 
and the United Kingdom would soon debate this proposal and turn it down. The United 
States’ role in this rejection surprised health experts from all over the world. ---------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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1.3.2 CEWG Report on Financing and Coordination 
The WHO established the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development 
(CEWG) in 2010 in order to assess the current global situation in R&D and make 
recommendations as to how the international community should handle the challenges. In 
their 2012 report, called “Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing 
Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination”, they found that the current 
international funding for health is insufficient due to market failures, and that increased 
funding is required to remedy the lack of capital provided for research into neglected diseases. 
Both advantaged and developing countries have failed to meet their commitments to increase 
their government expenditure on R&D that will benefit the developing countries. Although 
the recommendations do not directly address the high cost of pharmaceuticals, it is reasonable 
to assume that more funding into R&D on neglected diseases will lead to more competition 
between drug companies and hence push prices down (2012: 83).  
 
International funding to R&D benefiting developing countries is currently USD 3 billion 
annually, USD 2 billion of which are publicly funded by the governments of developing 
countries. Advantaged nations and private donors fund the rest. The CEWG estimates that a 
doubling of the total figure to USD 6 billion annually, would correct the current market 
failures. This number represents 0.01 per cent of the global GDP, which is valued at over 
USD 60 trillion. Furthermore, they argue that this figure is very reasonable when one takes 
into account the huge disparity in allocation of R&D devoted to the needs of developing 
nations in the last 20 years (Research and Development, 2012: 84). Their principal conclusion 
is that:  
 
All countries should commit to spend at least 0.01% of GDP on government-funded  
R&D devoted to meeting the health needs of developing countries in relation to the  
types of R&D defined in our mandate (Research and Development, 2012: 84). 
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The CEWG finds that using a percentage of GDP is the best way to encourage fair 
contributions from all states (Research and Development, 2012: 84). It could be argued that, 
even if one discards the ethical problems that arose from the property protection system, all 
nations should want to resolve this funding problem because the entire world will benefit 
from R&D into neglected diseases. Malaria and tuberculosis are killing millions, and they 
have both evolved pharmaceutical resistant strains. It is important to continue research on 
these diseases in order to prevent their spread and possibly an epidemic.  
 
1.3.3 Reactions to the CEWG report 
The World Health Assembly arranged an open-ended meeting for their members in order to 
discuss the feasibility of the CEWG report in Geneva, Switzerland in 2012. Present were 
representatives from all of WHO’s member nations. In advance, expectations were that the 
imposition of a binding annual tax would be unwelcome to some countries, particularly the 
poorer ones. Rather surprisingly, however, the main opposition of the establishment of 
international pooled funding of R&D for developing nations came from the United States. 
This was surprising because the United States was the only country that did not have to 
increase their expenditure if the fund was established – they were already paying their share. 
Because the United States is arguably the most important political actor of the 21st century, 
and because it is home to the biggest economy in the world, their membership would have an 
enormous impact for the legitimacy and functioning of such an international convention. 
Their rejection of the proposal therefore served as a de facto veto (Carter, 2012).  
 
Nils Daulaire, director of the Office of Global Health Affairs for the United States 
Department of Health and Human services, spoke on behalf of his nation. He addressed the 
problem of insufficient R&D in developing nations while emphasizing that the United States 
was the only WHO member that had met its funding goal. He also acknowledged the inability 
of market forces to provide incentives for R&D for the world’s poor. In response to the 
CEWG’s recommendations of establishing an international fund with binding annual 
payments as a percentage of GDP, however, he denied support from the Obama 
administration and the United States. They also rejected the idea of setting aside a certain 
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amount of international funding to pooled funding mechanisms. Such mechanisms ensure that 
the administration of the fund, rather than the donor country, decides what countries and what 
projects receives funding. Daulaire expressed his view that a binding financial commitment to 
such a fund could be construed as a “global tax”, and that there was not sufficient consensus 
on the recommendations of the CEWG. Instead, they proposed the creation of an organ for 
international research observation, consideration of voluntary pooled funding, direct business 
funding, procurement agreements and prizes for R&D (Carter, 2012).  
 
With the support of the United States, the chances of establishing an international R&D fund 
with binding annual payments would vastly improve. This, in turn, would force all member 
nations to share the funding load, which the United States currently largely carries. If 
achieving sufficient funds for R&D in developing nations were the goal of the United States, 
as they expressly claim it is, why would they reject such a proposal when, compared to what 
they are already contributing, it would cost them nothing? Ideological reasons may be key in 
answering this question. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Global governance 
Global governance is a phenomenon in which states institutionalize cooperation in order to 
achieve certain goals that they are unable to accomplish on their own. In the words of political 
scientist and former UN employee, Lawrence S. Finckelstein:  
Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that 
transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what 
governments do at home (Finckelstein, 1995: 369).  
 
The classical realist view of international affairs that has dominated scholarly thought 
throughout history claims that because the international arena is anarchic, no superior 
coordinating body can induce states to behave differently than they would normally do. 
Liberalists and Institutionalists, who most often side with Liberalists, have contested this 
view. They believe the presence of international organs such as the UN Security Council, the 
IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the EU significantly changes the structure of 
international relations from anarchy to one of global governance. Therefore, in the instances 
where states agree that there is need for collective action to solve a problem, which for 
example is the case with climate change as well as international access to medication, they 
may sign binding agreements that require a change in behavior from what the states would 
normally do. When such change happens at no cost to the states, the agreement merely has a 
coordinating function. Examples of this include coordination of radio frequencies and 
provision of country codes. When there are costs attached to a state’s behavioral change, 
however, the threshold for signing is higher. The same is true for compliance with such 
agreements, which signing in no way guarantees. To illustrate this anarchic situation one can 
look at the Kyoto Protocol, which was the result of an international effort to establish 
transnational control over the climate regime. The United States and Canada both signed the 
Kyoto Protocol for climate change in 1997, but the United States never ratified the agreement, 
and Canada withdrew entirely in 2011 (Austen, 2011).  
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There are different opinions as to what are the necessary requirements for international 
cooperation to be successful. Some believe enforcement mechanisms are essential to ensure 
compliance. Others believe states only enter into the agreements they intend to keep, and that 
changing circumstances explain non-compliance. Conditions for the effective functioning of 
international regimes are presented below. 
 
2.1.1 Conditions for international regime effectiveness 
Arild Underdal (2002) explains regime effectiveness by looking at the character of the 
problem itself as well as the problem solving capacity of the regime.  
 
Identical preferences between all actors means that a problem is perfectly benign, and can be 
solved through coordinating efforts. The further away from this situation, however, the more 
malign the problem becomes. Incongruence between an outcome that is collectively beneficial 
and the individual preferences of each state characterizes malign problems. Ideology, culture, 
history and dominant society groups influence individual state preferences, as will be 
explained in further detail below (Underdal, 2002). In addition, in the case of the CEWG’s 
suggestion, all states, especially the less economically developed, have an incentive to free 
ride. If R&D on neglected diseases increases because of international funding, all states will 
benefit, also the ones who do not contribute. The suggestion made by the CEWG requires all 
states to share the burden of funding, however, and this is unpopular for many nations that 
would need to increase the expenditure on R&D from their current levels. An effective 
international regime could help ensure that all nations contributed to reaching a solution.  
 
Certain conditions are necessary for the effective functioning of international regimes. These 
are broad and stable participation, deep commitments and high compliance rates. Deep 
commitments means that the nations must commit to doing something they otherwise would 
not have. In the case of the CEWG suggestion, commitments are deep and binding. Very few 
countries use 0.01 per cent of their GDP on R&D as of now, but they would have had to if 
they signed an international agreement establishing the fund. High compliance rates would 
have been necessary to ensure in order for the fund to function properly. This is an irrelevant 
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measure because the regime does not exist as of yet, however, many scholars argue that 
potent enforcement mechanisms are necessary in order to ensure high compliance (Levy et al. 
1995). The CEWG suggestion included no such mechanisms. 
 
The most important condition for the regime the CEWG intended is that of broad and stable 
participation. This means that all major countries ratify, and that no major countries withdraw 
(Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre, 2013). This condition is clearly unfulfilled in the case of the CEWG 
fund. The United States has been the leader of the Western world for over a century, and the 
ideological impact of their participation in such a fund cannot be underestimated. Britain, 
France and Canada have also rejected the regime. What impact the United States’ rejection 
had on their decisions is difficult to determine, but it is reasonable to assume that it made 
further rejections less problematic. The United States decision therefore resulted in the fact 
that the CEWG fund fails to meet the first criterion of a successful international regime, and it 
is important to explain why. 
 
2.2 International relations 
2.2.1 Leading theories 
There are several different theories of international relations. They differ in what they believe 
defines a state’s relationship to the outside world and what constitutes its main objectives. 
The most influential theories are Realism, Institutionalism, Liberalism and Constructivism. 
 
The earliest and perhaps historically most accepted theory is realism. Although the concept 
has varied to some extent since the classical Realism of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
the main principles are still the same. According to Realists, anarchy, and therefore 
uncertainty, defines international relations. States are the most important actors, and they 
behave in a unitary manner. Their main task is ensuring the continued survival of the nation, 
and the best way to achieve this is through increasing its own power. Power is defined in 
terms of what enables a state to protect its own interest, whether it be military, economic or 
diplomatic capacity, but coercive power is ultimately the main measure. States behave as 
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rational unitary actors who calculate the potential gains and losses that result from interaction 
with other states, and will only cooperate with others if it involves an increase in its own 
power. Realists therefore do not believe in international institutions with the ability to dictate 
state behavior. Such systems may reflect existing power relations, but will not hinder a state 
from doing what it believes is in its interest (Østerud, 2007: 241).  
 
Institutionalism shares many of the assumptions found in Realism. Robert Keohane 
influenced this tradition greatly with his work After Hegemony from 1984. Institutionalists 
believe states are self-interested, unitary actors who seek to increase their material gains in 
order to defend themselves in an international community defined by uncertainty. In contrast 
to realists, however, they believe that institutionalized cooperation with other states can 
sometimes be the most rational strategy. Game theory and the concept of repeated games have 
influenced this notion. If two or more states are expected to cooperate on more than one 
occasion, for example if they are trading partners, it is assumed that their behavior at one 
point will affect their reputation and hence the conditions with which they are met at another. 
International institutions contribute to restructuring incentives in an otherwise anarchic 
system, and are therefore a rational mechanism for states to ensure survival (Keohane and 
Martin, 1995). 
 
Liberalism is a theory that is less unified and cohesive than the two previously mentioned, but 
common for scholars of this branch is the belief that national characteristics of a state, as well 
as the surrounding domestic and international society, affects how it acts in relation to others. 
Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill are prominent authors in this tradition. The belief in the 
difference between individual goals contrasts the views in Realism and Institutionalism that 
all states have essentially the same targets and strategies in dealing with other states, namely 
increasing their own power in order to secure survival. Liberal scholars find this view 
simplistic, and believe history, culture, values and norms shape state behavior in the global 
arena. States do not merely respond to international occurrences, they make them happen. 
Andrew Moravcsik has developed a general liberal theory of international relations, which is 
used in this thesis to explain the behavior of the United States in response to the CEWG 
report in 2012. The theory is explained in further detail below (Moravcsik, 1997). 
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Constructivism is more of an ontology rather than a theory. It is a set of assumptions about the 
world and human behavior and motivation. Variables generally interesting to political 
scientists do not have objective value according to Constructivists. Rather, the social and 
psychological interpretation of anything, for example military power, either at home or with 
the enemy, is what gives it value. A specific blend of history, culture, ideas and beliefs apply 
meaning to outside occurrences and explains a state’s response to these. To Constructivists, 
objective realities are in themselves insufficient in explaining international relations. Only by 
wearing a very specific pair of theoretical glasses can a scholar correctly interpret multilateral 
relations (Ruggie, 1998).  
 
2.2.2 Choice of theory 
Both Realism and Institutionalism seem unable to explain the United States’ rejection of an 
international fund for R&D with binding annual payments from member states. The United 
States is currently spending proportionally more money than any other state on remedying the 
negligence of health issues in developing nations. If they agreed to the establishment of an 
international fund, they would achieve their goal without additional costs to themselves. At 
the same time, other states would have to contribute economically on the same terms 
proportional to their GDP. No other state does so at this point. If one considers economic 
capacity a determinant of power, which Realists and Institutionalists do, this would actually 
result in an increase of the United States’ power relative to the other member nations. 
Increasing power in order to ensure state survival is the only guiding principle in international 
relations according to Realists, and the theory therefore seems insufficient in explaining the 
United States’ behavior. This is also true for Institutionalism, because one would assume that 
this particular situation is one where continued cooperation would most definitely result in a 
positive net gain for the United States. The case of the United States is illustrative of the 
problematic premises of Realism and Institutionalism in international relations. The 
assumption that states behave in a unitary manner where the ultimate goal is increased power 
relative to other states is too simplistic. Instead of seeking only power, I believe states pursue 
a multitude of goals at the same time. These goals are the product of a constellation of 
individual preferences and power structures within a nation. Only by understanding the 
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unique cultural, ideological and political character of a state, can we understand its behavior 
on the international arena. 
 
Constructivism is still considered quite controversial, and I disagree fundamentally with the 
premise that if not interpreted by someone, objective reality has little value of its own. John 
Gerard Ruggie (1982) and Peter Katzenstein et al. (1998) present moderate versions of 
constructivism, but for the purposes of this paper, I have chosen not to consider the 
constructivist perspective.  
 
For these reasons, I believe the Liberal tradition of international relations best explains the 
motivation behind the United States’ behavior in relation to the CEWG report. 
 
2.2.3 Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberalism 
Andrew Moravcsik is one of the most influential authors of the Liberal tradition of 
international relations. In the Analysis chapter of this thesis, his theory is integrated with 
Martin Lipset’s cultural study of the United States (1996) in an attempt to explain U.S. 
behavior concerning the CEWG proposal. An account of Moravcsik’s theory is therefore 
necessary.  
 
Andrew Moravcsik has built a theory around three core assumptions that he believes explain 
the nature of world politics. These define societal actors, the state and the international 
system. 
 
Assumption 1: The Primacy of Societal Actors:  
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, 
who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and 
collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by 
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material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik, 
1997: 516). 
 
According to Liberal theory, the political actions of a state are the result of an aggregation of 
the political preferences of its constituents. Individuals are rational beings in pursuit of what 
in their minds constitutes material welfare and ideal policies, and the perception of these 
varies from person to person. They act to promote their political agenda through the exchange 
of ideas and collective action. This ‘bottom-up’-interpretation of political motive means that 
individual preferences are prior to the collective political stance taken by a state in 
international relations. Individual preferences do not necessarily harmonize. Moravcsik lists 
three factors that contribute to conflicting societal demands: divergent fundamental beliefs, 
conflict over scarce material goods, and inequalities in political power. Irreconcilable 
differences over fundamental beliefs concerning political institutions, culture, public goods, 
and social practices contribute to conflict. Abundance of material goods is a harmonizing 
factor in society. Finally, equitably distributed power and stable political institutions that have 
become internalized in individuals are conducive to peace (1997: 517).  
 
Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences:  
States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the 
basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in 
world politics (1997: 518) 
 
Liberals do not regard the state as an actor. Rather, the institution is an instrument for control 
that is subject to constant capture and recapture by various dominant groups in society. Group 
preferences and power concentration translates into state policy through mandates in 
representative organs. Individuals turn to the state when they wish to achieve something that 
private behavior has proved unsuccessful in bringing about. Underlying identities and 
preferences continually pressure and influence government policy. All preferences are not 
equally represented, however. Even in countries like the United States, with open and fair 
participation in government, there are vast differences in access to information, property 
distribution, organizational capacity, and ability for risk-taking. These factors greatly 
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influence who can contribute to agenda setting through collective action and may create social 
monopolies within the political arena (1997: 518).  
 
It is important to distinguish between ‘state preferences’ on the one hand, and ‘strategies’ or 
‘policies’ expressed as a reaction to developments in the international arena on the other. 
Preferences are the fundamental interests of a specific nation and are independent of 
strategies. The former are prior to the latter by definition because they do not consider 
interstate political interaction. Prior preferences, however, largely influence strategies or 
policies in interaction with other states. There are two main way to conduct foreign policy, 
either unitary or disaggregated. The unitary way is if the state has a coordinated and common 
foreign policy strategy that represents the dominant group in society. The disaggregated way 
is if various branches of government pursue different strategies on behalf of social groups 
with differing fundamental beliefs (1997: 519). 
 
The combination of assumptions 1 and 2 means that states do not automatically follow 
rationally defined strategies of maximizing security, wealth and sovereignty in relation to 
other states, as is believed by the Realists and the Institutionalists. Rather, foreign policy is an 
expression of the unique combination of these variables as interpreted by the dominant groups 
in domestic society. States often knowingly surrender sovereignty, decrease wealth or 
compromise security for other purposes (1997: 519-520).  
 
Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System: 
The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior 
(1997: 520). 
 
Liberals believe each state’s government has its own ‘purpose’ that it mostly bases its foreign 
policy on. Decision makers realize, however, that they are not operating in a vacuum, and that 
they have to adjust their ideal policy in relation to the constraints presented by other nations’ 
foreign policy-agendas. In addition, Liberals believe international civil society, watchdog 
organizations, researchers and business pressure influences state policies. The combination of 
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pressure from various parts of international and domestic society can often lead to ambivalent 
state behavior and regulation. According to Helge Hveem, this is especially true for the 
international pharmaceutical regime that has developed since the implementation of TRIPS. 
He writes:  
 
The current situation with regard to international governance of IPRs [intellectual 
property rights] is a true mosaic of institutions and policy – multilateral, plurilateral, 
inter-regional and bilateral agreements, with national unilateral regulation inserted 
into it (Hveem, 2012: 94) 
 
Unlike Realists, Liberals do not believe foreign policy is merely a zero-sum game for scarce 
resources, and unlike Institutionalists, they do not believe preferences are partially convergent 
and merely the subject of a collective action issue. Specific state preferences, which vary as 
result of the particular fundamental beliefs of the social group dominating representative 
organs in a given territory, in combination with restraints created by other states’ actions 
determine state behavior. The critical link here is the concept of policy interdependence, 
which arises when the dominant social group of one country decides to realize its foreign 
policy agenda, and at the same time alters the set of costs and benefits for the various policies 
of foreign states. Such actions can contribute to harmony by mostly increasing welfare at 
home and for partnering nations, they can create conflict by mostly increasing costs, and they 
can have mixed effects and receptions in the global community. Liberals believe the form of 
cooperation that exists between states is highly dependent on domestic disagreements on 
social preferences and patterns. Where sub-optimal outcomes result from cooperation, 
currently dominant social preferences, unresolved domestic differences and international 
distributional conflicts are to blame (Moravcsik, 1997: 521).  
 
2.2.4 Robert Putnam’s double-edged diplomacy 
Robert Putnam first presented his theory of the integrated relationship between domestic 
bargaining and international negotiations in his 1988 article “Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”. According to this theory, one cannot explain 
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negotiations between states without looking at the domestic factors influencing the parties. At 
the same time, domestic policies are bound by what the international community of states will 
accept. In order to understand the in-depth study of Putnam’s theory in relation to the U.S. 
rejection of the CEWG proposal that is presented in the Analysis, a thorough account of his 
assumptions are given here.  
  
Putnam uses a metaphor of political leaders placing themselves strategically between two 
tables, one representing domestic politics and the other, international negotiations with 
foreign leaders: 
 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek 
to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be 
ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, 
yet sovereign (Putnam, 1988: 434). 
 
State leaders play a complex two-level game, where they both try to influence and are in turn 
influenced by the various players in the two games. What is a rational move on one table 
might not be on the other. Leaders therefore need to balance their moves in order to please 
both sides. At the same time, they will actively seek out support for their policies. There is a 
strong incentive for consistency between domestic and foreign rhetoric and the actual policy 
followed. The parties may allow some discrepancy, but leaders cannot commit to opposing 
policies on the two different tables. Before the state leaders reach a decision, there are several 
rounds of internal bargaining. Here, they weigh the costs and benefits of various options 
(Putnam, 1988: 434). Other authors, among them Andrew Moravcsik, have dubbed this game 
played by state leaders “’double-edged’ diplomacy” (1993: 9).  
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The Bargaining Process: 
Putnam divides the bargaining process into two different stages called Level 1 and Level 2:  
• Level 1: Bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement (at the 
international level). 
• Level 2: Separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify 
the agreement (at the domestic level).  
In order for international negotiations to result in state policy, there needs to be domestic 
ratification in Level 2. Expectations of the likelihood of ratification in Level 2 will influence 
the bargaining process in Level 1. In Level 1, state leaders will only discuss the set of various 
policies and agreements that they believe could possibly be accepted in Level 2 at the 
domestic level, which in the case of the United States is in Congress. Putnam calls this the 
“win-set” (1988: 437). The larger the win-set, the more likely it is that an international 
agreement will be reached, ceteris paribus. This is because the actors at the other end of the 
table have their own win-sets, and the win-sets of the various parties need to overlap. 
Negotiators whose domestic constituencies will accept very few outcomes have little chance 
of reaching an agreement that also falls within what is acceptable to other parties’ 
constituencies. If several outcomes are possible in Level 2, however, the likelihood of some 
of these being acceptable to the other party (or parties) increases, all other things being equal 
(Putnam, 1988: 438). At the same time, a limited win-set can prevent negotiators from being 
pushed around by the other parties. The negotiator is able to say that an alternative seems 
reasonable to her, but that those at home will never accept it. This stance forces the other 
parties to restate their win-sets or the negotiations are over. The latter would be a no-
agreement outcome and very often, but not always, represents the status quo (Putnam, 1988: 
440-442). 
 
Critics may claim that state leaders often have an incentive to cheat when making 
international agreements. If states B, C and D are obliged to fulfill their commitments prior to 
state A, the negotiator for state A has an incentive to make the deal even if it falls outside its 
win-set. The negotiator makes a deal on behalf of state A that she is unable to deliver on. Her 
promise of ratification will not be accepted at home. The likelihood of cheating decreases 
sharply, however, if the states believe they will meet at the negotiating table again. This is 
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very often the case in today’s global arena, and a reputation for following through on 
agreements positively affects the bargaining power a party has in Level 1. At the same time, 
doubt about a negotiator’s political ability of ratification nullifies the positive benefits of a 
good reputation in Level 1 (1988: 438-439).  
 
Determining the size of win-sets: 
Three factors determine the size of the negotiators’ win-sets, and therefore also the 
development of international negotiations. These are Level 2 preferences and coalitions; 
Level 2 institutions; and Level 1 negotiator’s strategies. 
 
Level 2 preferences and coalitions – The distribution of power, preferences and possible 
coalitions among Level 2 constituents in the negotiators’ respective states influence the size 
of the parties’ win-sets. The relative cost of no-agreement to the dominant coalitions is 
therefore very important. Constituents who face low costs at no-agreement are generally less 
inclined to be in favor of Level 1 agreements. These are often called isolationists because they 
do not believe in the benefits of international cooperation (and their beliefs may be well-
founded in certain areas). Large, independent states tend to have more constituents leaning 
this way. Smaller states, on the other hand, are usually more internationally oriented and 
positive to Level 1 agreements. The former therefore tend to make less international 
agreements than the latter, ceteris paribus. The higher the cost of no-agreement to 
constituents, the larger the win-set (1988: 442-443). 
 
When constituents are relatively homogenous in their willingness to make a Level 1 
agreement, the negotiator merely needs to balance what she demands and what she sacrifices. 
Constituents will be satisfied when more is gained than yielded, all other things being equal. 
When the constituency is heterogeneous or divided on an issue, the negotiator has to use a lot 
more skill and cunning. The strategy of ‘the more, the better’ is no longer applicable, and she 
will try to influence constituents and seek support. A division in the domestic constituency is 
valuable for the opponent, because a government that is internally divided is more likely to 
make an agreement than one that follows a single strategy (1988: 444).  
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Public debate and politicization of an issue up for international negotiations can raise the 
activity of groups who are less worried about no-agreement and thus reduce the win-set. 
Diplomats therefore often stress the need for secret negotiations. Finally, if bargaining for 
multiple issues in Level 1 is possible, constituents in Level 2 might change their vote on the 
issue immediately at hand, if they gain something else as a result of the agreement. Such 
trade-offs are called side-payments and are common in negotiations. The purpose is not to 
alter the domestic sentiments, but to create a policy option that was previously out of 
domestic control (1988: 445-447).  
 
Level 2 institutions – The institutional rules of the Level 2 institutions highly influence the 
size of the win-sets. A constituency that needs a two-third vote for ratification will certainly 
have a smaller win-set than one that requires a simple majority vote. The higher the threshold 
for ratification in Level 2, the smaller the win-set. This increases the negotiator’s bargaining 
power, but also reduces the possibility of international cooperation. Partners will become 
warier of dealing with such a nation (1988: 448-449).  
 
Level 1 negotiator’s strategies – The negotiator always has an incentive to increase her 
opponent’s win-set, which will make reaching an agreement easier. There is no safe strategy 
concerning her own win-set, however. A large win-set will make it easier to establish an 
international agreement, but it will also weaken the negotiator’s bargaining position in the 
face of opponents. A small win-set strengthens her bargaining position, but can lower the 
possibility of reaching an agreement. If one assumes that enlarging the win-set is the 
objective, side-payments can be used to alter the relative weight of the coalitions in the Level 
2 constituency in order to secure ratification. Additionally, a negotiator who has a high 
political standing at home is more likely to achieve ratification for the international 
agreements he has entered into. Therefore, party A has an incentive to increase the popularity 
of party B in order to enlarge the opposite side’s win-set, and vice-versa. Publicly honoring 
the opponent is therefore a good strategy. Finally, negotiations with high-ranking officials are 
preferable to the opponent. A high-ranking official can to a much greater extent use side-
payments, influence constituents and generally make things happen. Refusing to negotiate 
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with lower-ranking officials is therefore a rational as well as a symbolic strategy (1998: 450-
452). 
 
2.2.5 Putnam and Moravcsik 
Putnam’s theory fits well with Moravcsik’s, because they both agree that domestic 
preferences certainly influence how states behave in the global arena. This in no way denies 
the explanatory importance of international influences on behavior, nor the role of the state 
leaders themselves. Outside pressure and significant incidents will constrain the eligible 
options available for states. At the same time, the strategies chosen by state leaders, who try 
to manipulate domestic and foreign actors at the same time, also influence outcomes. The 
important thing the authors agree on, however, is that state leaders will not commit to an 
option or a general strategy without significant domestic support. In the Analysis, the 
theoretical consequences of Moravcsik’s assumptions are explored in relation to Martin 
Lipset’s assessment of U.S.-American culture. In addition, an in-depth analysis of the U.S. 
decision-making process prior to the rejection of the CEWG proposal is conducted using 
Putnam’s theory.  
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3 Methods 
3.1 Case study 
The product of a good case study is insight (John Gerring, 2009: 9). 
The method I have chosen for explaining the United States’ rejection of the proposal that 
came up at the World Health Assembly is the case study. What characterizes this mode of 
research is the focus on a few or even a single unit or event in order to understand the causal 
mechanisms that have occurred prior to the event. By either locating the exact causal pathway 
leading to an event or the intricate characteristics of a spatially delineated unit, researchers 
hope to be able to generalize beyond the boundaries of the case in question. If we understand 
exactly how and why a certain phenomenon has occurred, we may be able to learn which 
mechanisms are active in other cases. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a defining 
characteristic of the case study is that the unit in focus is not perfectly representative of the 
population to which we wish to generalize. The same is to a certain extent also true for large 
cross case analyses, however, and for these we do not have access to the richness of 
observations that is available in the case study (Gerring, 2009: 10-20).  
 
John Gerring defines a case as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single 
point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an 
inference attempts to explain” (2009:19). For political scientists, the unit is often a nation 
state, though this is certainly not always the case. Other units of focus may be electoral 
districts, cities, and so forth. In my research, however, I will focus on the United States at the 
time of the World Health Assembly in 2012. I will try to explain the phenomenon of why they 
refused the CEWG recommendation. In order to do this, I will certainly have to extend the 
scope of my research to include observations from the past, but the case I try to explain is 
observed at a single point in time.  
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3.1.1 Process tracing 
Because the goal of my research is insight into the causal mechanisms that produced the 
United States’ decision, I need to explore prior events through the process tracing method. 
The particularity of the United States’ current situation as the biggest funder of R&D into 
neglected diseases resulted in my belief that the outcome, the rejection of the fund, was 
reached via a different path in the United States than in the other countries who rejected the 
proposal. For this reason, process tracing is a valuable method for unveiling the causal 
mechanisms of what I believe to be a rare phenomenon, or even a deviant case (Gerring, 
2009: 105-106), in a global setting. A deviant case is one where the outcome or phenomenon 
in question is somewhat surprising in terms of the observers’ established knowledge. For 
Zach Carter, the author behind a Huffington Post article reporting on the U.S. rejection of the 
proposal, it is difficult to understand why the United States would reject a fund proposed by 
the relatively impartial, solution focused WHA, and that at the same time poses no further 
expenses on their part. Political scientists will recognize that there are other factors 
influencing the decision, and I will try to find out what these are. Once these factors are 
identified, the case is no longer deviant (2009: 108). The optimal way to conclude whether 
this in fact is a deviant case would be to do case studies of the decision-making processes of 
the other western countries that rejected the proposal, and then compare these to that of the 
United States. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, that task is not undertaken here. 
 
By looking thoroughly at the numerous factors that may have implicated the decisions 
reached by the United States at the World Health Assembly, I will try to explain a set of 
research questions that I have posed prior to the analysis. The problem of rejecting a correct 
null-hypothesis is present with case studies, however, and it is difficult to prove or disprove a 
hypothesis based on a single case. This has to do with the extent to which the results of my 
research are generalizable to a larger number of units, or external validity. The knowledge 
gained from this research may indicate what mechanisms are at play in similar situations for 
the same unit, the United States, and help shed light on how lobbyism affects political 
decisions. My goal, however, is not to establish a general rule. It is therefore important to note 
that I believe the outcome of my research will provide possible insight and explanation to a 
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phenomenon that may seem peculiar for an outside observer, rather than generate strict laws, 
prove, or disprove alternative hypotheses about what caused the rejection.  
 
3.1.2 Sources 
One of the sources I will use for my analysis is the Huffington Post article by Zach Carter, 
which includes a copy of the direct correspondence between Nils Daulaire and the journalist, 
as well as Mr. Daulaire’s statement at the World Health Assembly. The article is therefore 
both a primary and secondary source. The journalist Mr. Carter’s own words are a secondary 
source because he interprets the events, while Mr. Daulaire’s statements are a primary source 
because he experienced the events under study first hand. I will also look at the final report 
from the 28th Pan American Sanitary Conference, 64th Session of the Regional Committee of 
WHO for the Americas that took place in Washington, D.C. in September 2012 (28th Pan 
American Sanitary Conference – Final Report, 2012: 35-38). Also, a first hand description of 
the discussions at the 28th Pan American Sanitary Conference is used (Cox, 2012). Both the 
Final Report and Cox’s description of the events at the 28th Pan American Sanitary 
Conference are primary sources because those present at the event wrote them. The levels of 
bias and objectivity are different, however. While the Final Report is an official WHO 
document presenting a summary of events from an objective point of view, it is difficult to 
determine whether Cox’s writing is biased. However, the non-governmental organization that 
Cox writes for, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) claims that their goal is the 
promotion of “better outcomes, including new solutions, to the management of knowledge 
resources” (About KEI, 2014). KEI is a respected organization and were present in the WHO 
preliminary teleconference between the CEWG and the PAHO (Report of the Conference 
Call, 2011). There are no weighty reasons to believe that Cox would deliberately misrepresent 
the reality of what occurred at the PAHO conference. Finally, a press release for Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) is used to highlight highly invested outside observers’ reactions to the 
United States’ decision. MSF is a widely acknowledged and respected organization that 
represents the informed opinion of health personnel on a global basis (MSF Access, 2012). 
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The other sources used in my research are secondary literature containing descriptions of a 
sociological and historical nature. These are Seymour Martin Lipset’s American 
Exceptionalism: A double-edged sword (1996), Mauk and Oakland’s American Civilization. 
An Introduction (2009), and Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (first published 
in 1835). Finally, theoretical tools with which to interpret the sources are gathered from 
secondary literature that mostly are of a scientific nature.  
 
3.1.3 Reliability, validity and limitations 
Although reliability and validity are treated separately in quantitative studies, these 
terms are not viewed separately in qualitative research. Instead, terminology that 
encompasses both, such as credibility, transferability and trustworthiness is used 
(Golafshani, 2003: 600). 
The concept of reliability is characterized by the accuracy of measurements, analyses and 
methods used in a research experiment. The reliability of a piece of research is high if 
replication by another researcher is expected to result in the same measurements and 
outcomes as those produced in the original. In other words, reliability has to do with the 
extent to which testability, re-testability and replication of the observations, analysis and 
results of an experiment are possible. Measurement accuracy is often more relevant in 
quantitative than in qualitative research, for this reason, the concept of reliability needs to be 
redefined in terms of a case study that does not rely on quantitative measures (Golafshani: 
2003).  
 
Validity is a concept that determines whether the indicators we use to build the premises and 
conclusions of an investigation correspond to reality. In other words, a high degree of validity 
means that there is a high probability that what we determine as causes and mechanisms of an 
outcome actually produced that outcome. External validity, as mentioned above, is the degree 
to which it is possible to generalize from the results found in one piece of research to a larger 
population. Although I may be able to make suggestions about similar situations, the richness 
of variables that will be taken into account in my research will make it difficult to find 
phenomena where the ceteris paribus-concept applies; where all other things are equal.  
34 
 
 
Internal validity refers to the causal relationship between the results found in a research study, 
and the variables they are based upon. In order for internal validity to be strong, there has to 
be a high degree of plausibility and likelihood that the variables studied produce the 
conclusions drawn from a piece of research. The deductions made therefore need to be well 
founded, logically acceptable and compelling (Gibbert, Ruigrok &Wicki, 2008: 1466). By 
using process tracing and source triangulation, the researcher is able to generate information 
from various sources in order to reach knowledge and come closer to learning the truth. Raino 
Malnes (2012) writes that it is impossible literally to compare all statements with reality, 
because this would require constant and ever-present observation. In order to generate 
statements that are as close to the truth as possible, we instead need to gather small pieces of 
information from various trusted sources so that our representation of reality comes as close 
to the truth as possible (Malnes, 2012: 53). By using process tracing and data source 
triangulation, which includes gathering information from multiple sources and observations, I 
hope to gather enough evidence to convince the reader that the conclusions drawn about the 
United States’ decision are correct, and hence adhere to the concept of strong internal validity. 
 
Healy and Perry propose that instead of using the concepts of reliability and validity, we 
should instead focus on “credibility, neutrality or confirmability”, “consistency or 
dependability” and “applicability or transferability” for qualitative research (2000: 122). In a 
way that closely corresponds to reliability in quantitative research, Lincoln and Guba use 
“dependability” about qualitative research (1985: 300). The distinction lies in how researchers 
present and analyze the data used in qualitative research in order to increase the 
trustworthiness of the conclusions drawn. Source triangulation is a widely acknowledged 
method of increasing the validity of a case study that uses singular, non-repeatable 
observations, data reduction products, secondary sources and raw material.  
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4 Analysis 
4.1 Research questions 
According to Andrew Moravcsik and Robert Putnam, states facing foreign policy decisions 
do not automatically act in the most rational way, in terms of the Realism school, in order to 
increase wealth and power. Individual preferences of the dominant social group influence 
state behavior, and these preferences are based on culture, history and ideology rather than 
pure power-increasing rationality. In other words, we need to consider the domestic cultural 
environment of any nation in order to understand their foreign policy decisions. Seymour 
Martin Lipset has written extensively on the exceptional nature of the U.S. national identity 
and the American Creed (1996). His findings are applied to the framework of Moravcsik’s 
and Putnam’s theories of international relations in order to better understand the U.S. decision 
to turn down the CEWG fund. I have developed four research questions that are answered in 
the following sections. The first two questions are of a theoretical nature and explores how a 
combination of Lipset’s cultural study and Moravcsik’s study of international relations can 
help predict U.S. behavior on the global arena. The third and fourth questions are analyzed 
empirically. One of the research questions ask how a combination of Moravcsik’s theory and 
global governance theory is able to explain the impact of the United States’ decision. The 
research questions are: 
 
RQ1: How can Lipset’s theories be applied to Moravcsik’s framework? 
 
RQ2: How does Moravcsik’s and Lipset’s theories help explain the rejection of the CEWG 
proposal of an international fund for R&D into neglected diseases with binding annual 
payments? 
 
RQ3: How can Moravcsik’s theory of interdependence and global governance theory help 
explain the international impact of the United States’ rejection of the CEWG proposal? 
 
36 
 
RQ4: How can the United States’ decision not to back the CEWG proposal be interpreted in 
terms of Putnam’s theory of two-level diplomacy? 
 
First, however, is a summary of Lipset’s 1996 book, American exceptionalism: A double-
edged sword. The summary is quite extensive, but it is important for the reader to have a good 
understanding of Lipset’s analysis in order to comprehend the theoretical integration of 
Moravcsik’s and Lipset’s theories in the section following the summary. 
 
4.2 American Exceptionalism 
Seymour Martin Lipset believes the inhabitants of the United States of America have a culture 
as well as national identifiers that are qualitatively different from all other nations in the 
world. Whereas the people of other nations are bound together by a common history and 
heritage, the citizens of the U.S. are American because they believe in the same ideology, 
what Lipset calls the American Creed. The American Creed is a unique combination of 
liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire, and is a result of several 
historical developments starting with the American Revolution (Lipset, 1996: 19). Adherence 
to this Creed is what makes citizens American. It is uncommon to call a citizen of Norway un-
Norwegian no matter what her opinions are, but American citizens who express sentiments 
that starkly oppose the American Creed are often called un-American. Being American is the 
choice of being part of an ideology (1996: 18). 
 
The first description of America as an exceptional nation is found in Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America (1948: 36-37). He visited the United States in the 1830s and described 
a nation built around a vibrant democracy, voluntarism, individual rights and an inherent 
suspicion towards state authority that was unlike anything he had experienced in his native 
France. The lack of feudal structures, aristocracy and monarchy was something the world had 
not previously experienced. Whereas state authority and centralization was an intrinsic part of 
European society, the decentralization, lack of feudal structures and a belief in the self-
sufficiency and equality of individuals resulted in a cultural apprehension towards the state 
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among the inhabitants of the New World. This apprehension became a quality of American 
society, and was as strong as ever during the time of the American Revolution, which ended 
in 1783, and the following years. The United States today remains one of the most anti-statist, 
legalistic and rights-focused nations in the world (Lipset, 1996: 17-18).  
 
So how did this culture develop? Lipset explains the particular development by using Max 
Weber’s loaded die metaphor (Weber, 1949: 182-185). He imagines a die that is originally 
unbiased, but becomes loaded in favor of a number every time it is rolled. This means that 
there is an increasing probability of rolling that particular number with every roll. Like the 
die, Lipset believes the outcome of each historically significant occurrence influenced the 
decisions made and the outcomes of incidents in the future. Through historical developments, 
values became well entrenched culturally. They were the results of major events like the 
Revolution or wars with foreign powers, or the establishment of institutions like the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, Supreme Court rulings, and so forth (Lipset, 1996: 23-24).  
 
The United States was the first colony apart from Iceland that gained independence, and the 
founding fathers wanted to distance themselves from the political culture of the old world. 
They were very suspicious of centralized state power, and institutionalized these sentiments in 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The Constitution, which is the oldest written 
constitution in the world, established a federal republic with a built-in system of checks-and-
balances to keep the branches of government from becoming too powerful. The Bill of Rights 
protects citizens against state infringement of their individual rights. These developments 
highly influenced beliefs such as constitutional constraints on state power and the individual 
responsibility to fight for your rights. Because Americans believe in the limited role of 
government, they have not relied on the state for matters concerning welfare, health and 
unemployment to the same extent that inhabitants of other nations have. Unionized labor and 
socialist movements never gained any real momentum in the United States as it did in the 
other advanced states. In the latter, the presence of a major socialist party helped 
institutionalize social democratic values, such as state responsibility for welfare and health, to 
varying degrees. Even though there was an expansion of the state, following the New Deal 
policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to deal with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
same development never occurred in the United States (1996: 21-25).  
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Although Americans do not believe in the state as a main provider of social goods, there is 
one area in which the U.S. government has been consistent in its spending; the educational 
system. Egalitarianism in the American Creed means that all Americans are born equal and 
should have the same opportunities for socio-economic mobility if only they work hard 
enough. From its birth, the state has therefore been the main provider of education on all 
levels, as opposed to most European countries. The result has been a historically highly 
educated people who believe they have the sole responsibility for their own situation (1996: 
21-22). 
 
The United States is the most religious country in the world in terms of Christianity, except 
perhaps the Catholic countries Ireland and Poland. Lipset explains this by the lack of state 
funding received by various denominations of the Christian faith in the United States. In the 
Old World, the Church often received funding from the government, and was therefore not 
reliant on membership numbers in order to survive. In the U.S., however, the various 
Protestant sects that dominated the continent had to raise their own funds, and were therefore 
active in promoting the importance of church attendance. Only through membership and 
donations could they continue their existence. The concept of laissez-faire has therefore been 
historically important in explaining the individual and voluntary religiosity of the United 
States. Voluntarism has also been an important part of American culture in all levels of 
society. Membership and activity in voluntary associations has historically been the highest in 
the world, and Americans give a lot more money to charity than the populations of other 
nations (1996: 27). The widespread adherence to Protestant ethics also connects to the 
skepticism towards state authority. Each American believes he is responsible towards his own 
conscience rather than to the state (1996: 19-20).  
 
This Protestant-inspired moralism has also influenced politics, and this explains why all wars 
except World War II met opposition at home. Lipset explains how Americans need to believe 
they are going to war against “evil” itself rather than merely defending themselves (1996: 20). 
The Puritan leader, John Winthrop, who in 1630 spoke of the New World as a “City on a Hill 
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that the eyes of all people are upon” (Mauk and Oakland, 2009: 173), put this sentiment into 
words. The ‘City on a Hill’ would be a religiously transformed society that would serve as an 
example for England to follow. Many Americans, including George Washington and Barack 
Obama, have quoted Winthrop when they speak of the United States’ role in international 
relations. The scope and target of U.S. influence has changed since the days of Winthrop, but 
state leaders regularly confirm the common belief that the United States sets a unique 
example for the rest of the world to follow (2009: 173). 
 
There are, however, several downsides to American Exceptionalism. The United States has 
traditionally experienced the lowest numbers of voter turnout at parliamentary elections 
among advanced countries. The historically low numbers can be a result of the general anti-
statist sentiments of its inhabitants. According to the national Gallup poll, the American 
parliament, the Congress, had support from only a quarter to one fifth of the population in the 
1990s and reached an all-time low of only 12 per cent support in 2008. Because the people 
expect Congress to deal with the nation’s financial situation, the crisis that struck in 2008 may 
explain the unusually low numbers (Mauk and Okland, 2009: 149-150). However, when 
compared to the executive and judicial branches of government, represented by the President 
and the Supreme Court, Congress is the least popular (Jones, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the United States has the highest crime and incarceration rates among the 
traditionally Western nations, and comparatively soaring numbers on legal action among 
citizens and between citizens and the state. This is a result of the legalistic and rights-focused 
culture. Moreover, conflicts defined in moral terms are a lot more intense than in Europe. 
Topics such as abortion, gay rights, atheism, marital sanctity and similar issues are highly 
controversial, and the opposing sides have gone to extreme measures in order to push their 
views through. An example of this is the repeated burning down of abortion clinics and 
murders of doctors who perform abortions. With perhaps a few exceptions in the highly 
Catholic countries of Poland and Ireland, the right to abortion is a relatively non-controversial 
issue in Europe. The same is true for the other issues mentioned above. The history of 
Protestant moralism and the belief that one should act in accordance with one’s own 
conscience explains the intensity of these morally defined conflicts (Lipset, 1996: 28).  
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Finally, even though the United States scores high on indicators concerning social mobility, 
education levels, entrepreneurship and business success, there are also vast income 
inequalities compared to those found in Europe. Low savings and taxation, as well as few 
welfare benefits provided by government explain this inequality. The statist expansion of the 
1930s enhanced the role of the federal government, but welfare provisions that are common in 
most European countries, such as a comprehensive health care system, have not developed in 
the United States. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted in 2010. It is a 
bill setting federal standards to prevent insurance companies from exploitative behavior, 
makes sure affordable insurance is available, and it includes a section on subsidies to those 
who are unable to purchase their own insurance. The bill, often dubbed ObamaCare, preserves 
the system of private health care and insurance. Nonetheless, it has met severe opposition 
from all levels in society who claim the bill is ‘socialist’ or ‘un-American’ and represents the 
“biggest shift in the relationship between the government and the people” in American history 
(Fox News, 2013). 
 
How can Lipset’s analysis be applied to the theoretical frameworks of Moravcsik and 
Putnam? Can a combination of the theories shed light on why the United States chose to 
oppose the establishment of a binding international fund for R&D into neglected diseases, 
when this decision seems irrational to the outside observer? In order to explain the United 
States’ rejection of the CEWG fund, I have developed several research questions. 
 
4.3 Moravcsik 
4.3.1 Assumption 1: Primacy of societal actors 
RQ1: How can Lipset’s theories be applied to Moravcsik’s framework? 
In a democracy, the political actions of a state result from an aggregation of the political 
preferences of its constituents. Moravcsik agrees with this assumption, and does not believe in 
an objective state purpose that exists independently of individual preferences. In terms of the 
United States, this means that the preferences of the people, and therefore the members of 
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Congress cause and are prior to state policy. Preferences may be characterized by conflict or 
harmony. Moravcsik identifies three factors that contribute to highly conflicting societal 
demands. These are divergent fundamental beliefs, conflict over scarce material goods and 
inequalities in political power. On the other hand, harmonizing factors include abundance of 
material goods, equitably distributed power and stable political institutions.  
 
The point of interest here is whether there exists a divergence in the fundamental beliefs of 
society in general and therefore among the members of Congress. Seymour Martin Lipset 
would say that such fundamental differences exist to a lesser extent in the United States than 
in other nations. The American Creed is a national ideology that covers many aspects of life 
and culture, and most Americans adhere to it. It is important to mention that this does not 
mean that all Americans have the same opinion on various subjects. Interpretations of what 
constitutes liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire may differ 
violently, as they do in terms of moral issues such as abortion and gay rights. The varying 
degree to which the state should provide regulation of the market in order to improve the 
welfare of those who are worst off is also a matter of great dispute, as was exemplified by the 
controversy surrounding ObamaCare. So is the level of commitment to international 
involvement by the United States. An important distinction between the United States and 
other advanced countries, however, is that both sides of such disputes are placed relatively far 
to the isolationist side and to the right of the political spectrum, and that no real left-wing 
alternative exists. Some may argue that the two-party system of the United States has resulted 
in a convergence of ideologies between the two parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, 
due to the need to capture middle-ground voters. This does not explain why the convergence 
has happened on the right of the political spectrum and why most Americans believe their 
leaders should stay out of foreign affairs, however. A national ideology of individualism, 
liberty from the state, laissez-faire, and responsibility for one’s own situation and socio-
economic level does. Additionally, according to Putnam, Americans are less willing to 
commit to international cooperation because of the sheer size and influence of their country, 
its self-sustainability and capacity. The combination of these national determinants result in a 
nation that generally believes in little international involvement, low taxes and few welfare 
benefits provided by the state, albeit to varying degrees. The same is true for the members of 
Congress.  
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Regarding the other factors that contribute to conflicting societal demands, the conditions in 
the United States are arguably quite harmonizing. According to Moravcsik, abundance of 
material goods is conducive to harmony, and the United States is one of the most affluent 
nations in the world. As emphasized by Lipset, there is great welfare inequality within the 
population, but this has not shifted the traditional view that the state should not have a 
redistributional role. The Democrats believe in more redistribution of wealth by the state than 
the Republicans do, but the differences are marginal compared to those in other advanced 
countries, such as the European. Constituents seem to hold the impression that access to 
material goods is possible through hard work. 
 
Finally, equitably distributed power and stable political institutions also reduce the chance of 
conflict among constituents. The U.S. system of checks and balances makes sure that there is 
a division of power between the various branches of government: the judiciary, the executive 
and the bicameral legislature, and between the local, state and federal level. Furthermore, the 
political institutions established by the U.S. Constitution in 1787 have been some of the most 
stable in history and have remained relatively unchanged. Lipset would explain this by the 
immense respect with which Americans regard the law, and especially the Constitution. The 
legitimacy of the political institutions remains intrinsic to the constituents and are under no 
immediate threat, even if the people express their misgivings at times.  
 
4.3.2 Assumption 2: Representation and state preferences 
Assumption 2 of Moravcsik’s theory discards the notion of the state as an actor in itself. 
Rather, the state is subject to capture and recapture of dominant societal groups. State policy 
is result of the ruling group’s various preferences and priorities. Moreover, as mentioned 
above foreign policy is an expression of the dominant groups’ interpretation of security, 
wealth and sovereignty. Underlying identity factors will influence the way groups interpret 
these.  
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If Seymour Martin Lipset’s description of American exceptionalism were applied to 
Moravcsik’s theory, it would suggest that the dominant groups in U.S. society have 
preferences that lean more to the isolationist rather than the internationalist end of the 
spectrum. In addition, they would be distrustful of centralized control, opposed to market 
intervention and government sponsored welfare benefits. Finally, they would be highly 
critical of taxes. This could help explain the United States’ rejection of the CEWG’s proposal, 
which brings us over to the second research question.  
 
RQ2: How does Moravcsik’s and Lipset’s theories help explain the rejection of the CEWG 
proposal of an international fund for R&D into neglected diseases with binding annual 
payments? 
 
For an outside observer, it would seem that by rejecting the international R&D fund, the U.S. 
surrenders security and wealth, and arguably reputational benefits. The fund would provide 
much needed research into diseases that are currently developing pharmaceutical resistant 
strains. These can possibly threaten the entire world in the future, and more research could be 
interpreted as an investment in security. The fund might also help fix the market failure that is 
currently causing the lack of research into neglected diseases. This would increase the 
stability and legitimacy of the global market and contribute to the socio-economic 
development of many nations. In turn, this could benefit the global economy and therefore 
increase wealth. Finally, the U.S. could have institutionalized their leadership in preventing 
the development and spread of neglected disease, and reaped the international acclaim that 
comes with such a role. This fits well with the notion of the ‘City on a Hill’, and would 
require no raise in expenditure from the U.S.  
 
If we believe Moravcsik and Lipset, their explanation of the U.S. rejection can be found in the 
strength of the various preferences of the dominant groups in control of the United States. It 
appears that the aversion to centralized control, taxation and interference with the market 
system prevents the United States from wanting to institutionalize their commitment to R&D 
into developing diseases. The components of the American Creed are therefore highly 
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relevant in explaining the preferences of dominant societal groups and in extension their 
interpretations of national interest. Mr. Daulaire, who led the negotiations, even stated that a 
major part of the problem was that the binding annual payments into such a fund could be 
construed as a global tax (Carter, 2012). Furthermore, the establishment of such a fund would 
take control over investment flows away from the U.S. and into the hands of a ‘supranational’ 
institution. This starkly opposes the tradition for decentralization, isolationism and 
sovereignty in the United States. Finally, whereas support to R&D into neglected diseases 
now represents voluntary contributions and goodwill, a binding global fund could be 
interpreted as an institutionalization of a breach with the laissez-faire culture that is so 
dominant in American society. 
 
4.3.3 Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System 
Specific state preferences regarding foreign policy and restraints created by other states’ 
actions result in a sort of policy interdependence that determine state behavior. When the 
dominant social group of one country decides to realize its foreign policy agenda, this alters 
the cost-benefit analysis of the foreign policy options available to other nations. As a result, 
what one nation does in terms of foreign policy influences what others will do in the future. In 
the case of the U.S.’ rejection of the CEWG proposal, it is interesting to look at how this 
decision might have affected the official statements of other states at the WHO summit. The 
global governance theories presented in the Theoretical Framework chapter are useful in 
interpreting these. 
 
4.3.4 Interdependence and global governance theory 
RQ3: How can Moravcsik’s theory of interdependence and global governance theory help 
explain the international impact of the United States’ rejection of the CEWG proposal? 
 
The U.S. rejection of the proposal made it easier for the other nations who did not wish to 
commit to binding annual payments to reject it as well. There would be high costs attached to 
the states’ behavioral change if they were to sign the agreement. Most significantly, they 
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would lose full control of their spending and in most cases, except in the U.S.’s, would need 
to increase the amount spent on R&D. The threshold for signing is therefore high from the 
outset, and the same is true for compliance if the agreement were signed. Most notably, 
France and Great Britain rejected the proposal after the United States made their views 
known.  
 
The problem of how to fund R&D into neglected diseases is a malign one. Preferences 
concerning what the international community should do about the problem of R&D into 
neglected diseases varies greatly from state to state. In many cases, the terms of realism are 
sufficient to explain why most states would oppose a binding fund: they would not be able to 
afford an increase in spending on R&D without taking scarce funds away from other posts 
that they deem more important. However, if one digs a little deeper it is necessary to look at 
why the preferential priorities vary among states. Aside from a few expenditure posts clearly 
in line with realist premises, like the military, liberalism can provide a better explanation for 
the uniqueness that constitutes a state’s priorities. The unique preferences of the dominant 
social group in the various states explain why there is a difference in opinion concerning the 
importance of the question at hand. Furthermore, there would be strong incentives for all 
nations to free ride, but especially for developing countries with limited financial means. 
Increased spending into R&D would benefit them whether they contributed or not. It is 
possible that the United States and other leading nations realized that this incentive would be 
too great, and deemed the success of the regime unlikely. This judgment call may also be an 
important part in explaining why no agreement was reached. 
 
The likelihood of success for the international regime dropped after the United States rejected 
the proposal. As mentioned previously, the conditions for international regime success are 
broad and stable participation, deep commitments and high compliance rates. Broad and 
stable participation means that all major countries ratify, and that no major countries 
withdraw. Because the United States rejected the proposal, the first premise fails. This is not 
important only because of the sheer size of the United States, but also because their rejection 
has an immense symbol effect for other nations, both advanced and developing. Many still 
regard the United States as the most influential power in the world, and while it is true that the 
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absence of the U.S. in such a fund would reduce its financial capacity greatly, the most 
important effect is arguably the lack of legitimacy the fund would suffer as a result. 
 
The other two conditions for international regime success are less relevant for the case in 
question because no agreement was reached. However, states, including the U.S., may have 
considered the proposal in light of these factors prior to making a decision concerning the 
fund. It is therefore worth mentioning how the proposed CEWG regime would score on the 
remaining conditions. The second factor necessary for success is deep commitments. Deep 
commitments mean that states alter their behavior as result of being part of the international 
regime. In the absence of the regime, the states would behave differently. The requirement for 
deep commitments is fulfilled in the case of the CEWG fund. All states except the United 
States would have to increase their expenditure on R&D as result of commitment to the fund. 
True, the U.S. would have to give up micro-management of their financial flows into R&D, 
but if the fund actually improves global health, which the U.S. claims is also their goal; this is 
arguably a small sacrifice. The important factor for international regime success, however, is 
the behavioral change of the majority of signatories. 
 
Finally, high compliance rates are necessary to ensure the success of international regimes. 
Because the proposed fund had no institutionalized enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult to 
imagine high levels of compliance from nations whose incentive to free ride is strong or who 
have a combination of limited means and strong preferences in other areas besides R&D into 
neglected diseases. The probability of faltering compliance rates is therefore relatively high. 
This may have factored into the U.S. and other nations’ rejection of the proposal. 
 
Ultimately, policy interdependence between domestic preferences and other states’ behavior 
help explain why the CEWG proposal failed. While domestic preferences in many nations 
may initially have been negative to the proposal due to its low likelihood of success, the U.S. 
decision to reject an international fund certainly influenced the ease with which other states 
were able to reject it as well. If the U.S. had taken on the role as a leader, and a leader by 
example due to their current contributions to R&D, other states such as Canada, the United 
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Kingdom, and France, would have a more difficult time explaining why they would not 
contribute along the same lines as the U.S. The United States’ blocking of the proposal 
therefore created a policy option that was not there prior to their decision.  
 
4.4 Putnam 
In this section, Putnam’s theory is applied to the case of the U.S. blocking of the CEWG’s 
proposal. 
RQ4: How can the United States’ decision not to back the CEWG proposal be interpreted in 
terms of Putnam’s theory of two-level diplomacy? 
 
4.4.1 The bargaining process 
In terms of Putnam’s theory, one has to identify the different players in U.S. politics who take 
part in the bargaining process. Level 1 players are negotiators who work in the international 
arena and provide a connection between domestic and foreign politics. Several types of 
officials can work with international relations on matters of various importance, but important 
ones include the President, his ministers, ambassadors and other diplomats. In the case of the 
CEWG proposal, Nils Daulaire, director of the Office of Global Health Affairs for United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, represents the leading negotiator as well as 
representative, and therefore Level 1.  
 
Level 2 participants are the constituents of each state whose decision it is whether to ratify an 
international agreement. In the United States, these are the members of the two Houses of 
Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The institutional details of the 
constituency will be described in more detail below. 
 
If one considers a state’s reputation to be an important contributing factor in international 
negotiations, the likelihood of cheating in terms of the proposed international fund is low. 
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Because all states are required to contribute to the fund, future partially repeated games are 
highly probable. It is likely that all states will meet with at least some of the others at the 
negotiating table again. Funding is provided as a percentage of GDP, which could be 
considered equal and fair. There is the risk of dissolving responsibilities, however, when all 
states are involved. Nations have an incentive to free ride because steps taken in R&D benefit 
them all, regardless of whether they contribute. Furthermore, in many cases there are doubts 
as to the ability of negotiators to ensure ratification of such an agreement in their home 
constituencies. This doubt reduces the probability of reaching an agreement. No-agreement in 
this case represents status quo of the current situation.  
 
4.4.2 The size of the United States’ win-set 
Preferences and coalitions 
The preferences and coalitions of the constituency, the Congress, partially determines the size 
of the U.S. win-set. Because of the sheer size and influence of the United States, in addition to 
its inherit cultural resistance to federal state authority and its responsibility for welfare, 
individual responsibility, low taxes and a focus on local government, there are many 
isolationists in U.S. politics. They generally face low to zero cost of no-agreement because 
they mostly do not believe in the benefits of international cooperation. Of course, there are 
constituents who argue that this view is wrong, but they are in a minority position. According 
to Putnam, constituents of large, independent states will be less favorable of international 
cooperation than those in smaller ones. This is certainly the case for the United States. 
Smaller states will have the incentive to cooperate with others in order to influence the 
international agenda. The United States is arguably very able to do this on its own, however, 
and therefore has a lower cost of no-agreement. The lower the cost of no-agreement, the 
smaller the win-set for the negotiator, Mr. Daulaire.  
 
The debate around the CEWG proposal has been very public and open. According to Putnam, 
this leads to a higher politicization of the issue, and raised activity among groups who do not 
worry about the outcome being no-agreement. This results in a smaller win-set because 
groups actively fight against several possible outcomes without concern for a possible no-
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agreement-situation. The WHO is also an issue specific arena for negotiations, and all nations 
are required to accept the CEWG proposal in order for the establishment of an international 
fund. This complicates and discourages the use of side-payments. It is unclear who would try 
to create policy options for whom, because no state has taken the lead in the negotiations. 
 
Level 2 institutions 
As mentioned above, the Level 2 constituents in U.S. politics are made up of the two 
chambers of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate has 100 
members, two from each state, all of whom are elected for periods of six years. 
Representatives in the House are chosen by congressional districts and face re-election every 
two years. There are 435 members of the House of Representatives. When a suggested law is 
under consideration in Congress, it is called a bill. For a bill to become law, it needs to pass in 
both the House and in the Senate. The President can veto a bill passed by Congress, but the 
legislative branch can override the veto by a two-thirds majority in both Houses (Mauk and 
Oakland, 2009: 129-131).  
 
Because a bill needs to pass in both Houses of Congress, and has to be signed by the 
President, the threshold for ratification of international agreements is high. Moreover, the 
legislative power is currently split between the two major parties in U.S. politics, the 
Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The Democratic Party controls the position of 
President and has a majority in the Senate, while the Republican Party has a majority in the 
House of Representatives. This further complicates the situation because both sides have an 
incentive not to back propositions from the other. If the Republican members of Congress 
backed a proposition made by the Democrats, they would betray their voters and at the same 
time contribute to the success of the opponent. The same is true if Democrats back a bill 
initiated by the Republicans. The result in many cases, and especially in controversial ones, is 
gridlock. The current situation lowers the probability of ratification in Level 2. 
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Level 1 negotiator’s strategies 
Following Putnam, Nils Daulaire’s strategies in negotiating with the other member nations of 
the WHO as well as with his own constituents will affect the U.S. win-set. Mr. Daulaire has 
realized that commitment to an international fund will not be ratified in Congress, and 
therefore accepts that no-agreement will be reached on this particular point. His win-set does 
not include the outcome that is proposed by the CEWG. By acknowledging that he in no way 
will be able to sway Congress in favor of an international fund for R&D, he effectively blocks 
the proposal and is able to focus the agenda onto matters more in line with current U.S. 
policies. Mr. Daulaire’s position as director of the Office of Global Health Affairs is also 
worth noting. By sending a negotiator who is a director of an office working on the specific 
issue concerned, the U.S. shows respect for the forum, the issue and the other participants. 
However, Mr. Daulaire is not among the highest-ranking officials of the U.S. government, 
and is therefore less likely to influence constituents, offer side-payments and generally pull 
strings. Opponents in the Level 1 negotiations know this, and Mr. Daulaire’s ability to set the 
agenda according to the actual wishes of Congress increases (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2014).  
 
The research I have conducted supports the notion that the United States acted rationally 
when considering the proposal presented at the World Health Assembly. The premises for 
their decision are different from the ones prescribed by the Realism school, however. By 
using the premises found in the school of Liberalism, process tracing, data- and theory 
triangulation, and the theories of Putnam, Moravcsik and Lipset it is possible to find very 
plausible and well-founded explanations for U.S. behavior with regards to the CEWG 
proposal. The explanations presented do not, however, address the legitimacy of the criticism 
raised by the international health experts from Doctors Without Borders and KEI online and 
from Mr. Carter at the Huffington Post.  
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate how the unique political, cultural and 
social particularities of a nation can affect the broad strokes of international politics. 
Expanding one’s perspective from merely looking at the incentives and rationality models as 
described by the Realism school is useful if one wishes to get a more nuanced and full view of 
how global politics are created and conducted. Liberalism is very helpful in this respect, and 
the works of scholars like Andrew Moravcsik and Robert Putnam contribute to explain 
phenomena that may seem inexplicable at the surface. This does not mean I can prove without 
doubt the causal mechanisms behind the United States’ decision to reject the CEWG proposal, 
but it is possible that I have come closer than others have.  
 
The first two research questions were theoretical in nature and asked how Martin Lipset’s 
theory could be applied to Moravcsik’s framework. Research questions 1 considered the 
consequences of societal actors’ preferences. I found that Lipset’s theories predicted 
isolationist preferences, opposition to centralization, market intervention, government 
redistribution, welfare benefits and taxes. Because of the American Creed, there is very little 
divergence in the fundamental beliefs of the citizens of the United States. These beliefs help 
shape people’s preferences, and are in turn reflected in elected representatives. In addition, a 
two-party system counteracts the polarization of institutionalized political preferences. It is 
important to stress that non-divergent fundamental beliefs do not result in equal preferences 
for all. Rather, the identification of these beliefs can help explain why the policy makers of 
nations tend to act in one way or another.  
 
The answer to research question 1 is very much tied to the second research question, which 
asked how Lipset and Moravcsik’s theories explain the United States’ decision to reject the 
CEWG proposal. Lipset’s predicted preferences, which in turn are expressed by the 
constituents of the United States, explain why commitment to a centralized, globally binding 
‘tax’ that interferes with established market mechanisms was turned down. Even though there 
are opposing forces in the population, and therefore among the constituents, these are not 
dominant. Other reasons, such as control of funding and institutional weaknesses, may have 
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weighed heavily on the decision, but should not have resulted in a total rejection of the 
proposal if the goal of the United States was to find a permanent solution to the lack of R&D 
into neglected diseases. 
 
The third and fourth research questions were of an empirical nature. Research question 3 
asked how Moravcsik’s theory of international interdependence and global governance theory 
predict the impact of the United States’ decision. According to Moravcsik, the foreign policy 
decisions made by the dominant social group in one state alters the cost-benefit analyses of 
foreign policy options for other states. Therefore, the United States’ decision to reject the 
CEWG proposal resulted in both the closing and opening of windows of opportunity for the 
other nations at the negotiating table. It is fair to assume that advantaged nations that to a 
certain extent identify with the policy goals of the United States, such as France, Canada and 
the United Kingdom would feel the pressure of accepting the proposal if the United States had 
done so first. This does not mean that U.S. support for the proposal would necessarily have 
resulted in the establishment of the fund, but the symbolic value of U.S. backing would make 
it difficult to reject the proposal entirely. When the U.S. failed to do so, however, rejection 
was made a lot easier, both for nations that identify with the U.S.’s value set and for those 
who for other reasons (perhaps mainly financial) did not want such a fund established. The 
U.S. rejection therefore represented a window of opportunity for states that were negatively 
set against the fund from the outset. Furthermore, global governance theory states that for the 
success of international regimes handling malign problems (problems that require an 
alteration in behavior from what the actors involved would usually have done), broad and 
stable participation as well as deep commitments and high compliance rates are necessary. 
Non-involvement from the United States and a lack of institutional enforcement mechanisms 
proposed for the CEWG fund means that the first and last of these requirements were not 
fulfilled. These factors may have influenced the decisions of Canada, France and the United 
Kingdom to reject the fund.  
 
The fourth and final research question asked how the United States’ decision not to back the 
CEWG proposal could be interpreted in terms of Putnam’s two-level diplomacy. In Level 1, 
Mr. Daulaire is expected to negotiate the U.S. position in the international WHO forum. 
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Because he needs ratification from his constituents back home (these represent Level 2), 
however, his bargaining position is severely influenced by preferences at home. A number of 
things made rejection of the proposal the only strategy for Mr. Daulaire. First, the size, 
affluence and influence of the United States predicts isolationist foreign policy preferences 
among citizens and constituents. Second, the American Creed predicts hostility towards 
centralization, taxes and intrusions into the markets. Third, the constitutional rules of the U.S. 
legislature makes the passing of laws dependent on acceptance in both Houses and by the 
President. Fourth, the Congress’ current split between the Democratic Senate and the 
Republican House of Representatives makes the passing of controversial laws very difficult. 
The negotiator in Level 1, Mr. Daulaire, knows the proposal will fail in Level 2, and therefore 
immediately rejects it. 
 
The main finding of my research is that the notion of an international fund with binding 
international payments and centralized control is incompatible with U.S.-American culture 
and ideology. The purpose of such a fund corresponds to the foreign policy goals expressed 
by the United States, and these goals were within reach without increased expenditure on the 
part of the U.S. However, the social, cultural and political preferences of the people, as 
expressed by the policy makers, made acceptance of the methods proposed by the CEWG 
impossible. The main contribution of my research is a development in the theoretical 
framework with which one can study states’ decision processes prior to international 
negotiations in general and in the United States in particular.  
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